Judicial Management and Judicial Disinterest: The Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft by Post, Robert C.
Judicial Management and 
Judicial Disinterest: 
The Achievements and Perils of 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
Robert Post 
William Howard Taft holds the significant 
distinction of being the only person in the his- 
tory of the nation to preside over two branches 
of the federal government. He was President 
from 1909 to 1913, and he was Chief Justice of 
theunited States from 1921 to 1930.1 
This achievement ought to have secured 
Taft a prominent position within the history of 
the Court. Yet Taft has drifted into almost com- 
plete professional eclipse. Although familiar 
to specialists in legal history, Taft is no more 
known to the average lawyer or law student 
than are Chief Justices White, Fuller, or Waite. 
Taft’s contemporary obscurity is remark- 
able. When Taft died on March 8, 1930, the 
nation convulsed in an overpowering and spon- 
taneous wave of mourning. He was widely char- 
acterized as “the most beloved of Americans,”* 
and hailed by observers like Augustus Hand, 
then a federal district Judge in New York, as 
“the greatest figure as Chief Justice since John 
Marshall.”3 Even Felix Frankfurter, certainly no 
admirer of Taft’s jurisprudence, was moved to 
observe that “Few public men have evoked such 
spontaneous and warm affection from the pub- 
lic as has Taft. . . . He is a dear man-a true 
human.”4 
This was a striking tribute to a man who 
had only eighteen years before been crushingly 
repudiated. Caught between Theodore 
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism and Woodrow 
Wilson’s New Freedom, Taft was blasted as a 
reactionary, and managed to obtain only a hu- 
miliating eight electoral votes in his 19 12 cam- 
paign for reelection to the presidency. Taft took 
defeat graciously, however, and he quickly be- 
came, in the famous phrase ofjournalist George 
Harvey, “our worst licked and best loved Presi- 
dent.”5 Although Taft had been known as the 
father of the labor injunction since his days as 
an Ohio state court judge, he mollified orga- 
nized labor during World War I by assuming 
the joint chairmanship (with Frank P. Walsh) of 
the National War Labor Board. The Board 
shocked industrial leaders not only by explic- 
itly recognizing the right of American workers 
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to unionize, but also by pledging official sup- 
port for the right of employees to receive a 
“living wage.”6 Taft also transcended parti- 
san politics by opposing the leaders of his 
own party in courageously and publicly 
championing Woodrow Wilson’s campaign 
to join the League of Nations. As a result, 
Harding’s nomination of Taft for the Chief 
Justiceship in July 1921 was greeted with 
“almost unanimous approvaL”7 It was, as 
the The New York Times remarked, “a ‘come- 
back’ unprecedented in American political 
annals.”* 
We may ask, then, how this man, who, as 
Walter Lippmann’s New York World observed, 
retired “as Chief Justice with the enduring af- 
fection of his countrymen,” with a “career” 
that “has no equal in our history,”g could have 
slipped so rapidly into such deep professional 
oblivion. The short answer, I think, may be 
found in Time magazine’s pithy assessment of 
The administrative 
responsibilities of the 
chief justiceship 
became apparent to 
William H. Taft 
quickly after taking 
the oath of office on 
July 12. Two weeks 
after being sworn in, 
Taft learned that 
Deputy Clerk Henry 
McKenney had 
passed away, leaving 
no one authorized to 
issue official papers 
because the Clerk of 
Court, James D. 
Maher (pictured), 
had died on June 3. 
Told it was 
unneccessary to 
consult with the 
Associate Justices on 
summer recess, Taft 
unilaterally decided 
to appoint Assistant 
Clerk William R. 
Stansbury to fill the 
position. 
Taft’s resignation: “Outstanding decisions: 
none.”‘O 
It is not, of course, that Taft wrote few opin- 
ions. Indeed, from October 192 1 through July 
1929, Taft authored 249 opinions for the Court. 
The prodigious nature of this accomplishment 
can be seen by contrasting Taft’s output with 
that of the four other Justices who served con- 
tinuously during those eight Terms: Holmes 
wrote 205 opinions for the Court, Brandeis 193, 
McReynolds 172, and Van Devanter only 94.” 
It is rather that Taft’s opinions were, as Holmes 
put it, “rather spongy.”’* Although Taft 
authored a good many opinions that were, 
within the context of his time, quite impor- 
tant, his writing was seldom crisp or elo- 
quent.13 Taft’s opinions were often suffused 
with judicious common sense, which per- 
versely blurred the expression of any sharp- 
edged and therefore memorable jurispruden- 
tial visi0n.1~ 
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Thus, at the time of Taft’s death, even his 
supporters recognized that “His name will not 
be . . . connected with any outstanding deci- 
sions-as are the names, for instance, of Chief 
Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Taney.”I5 
Instead, Taft’s unique achievements were said 
to lie in “his success as an administrator of the 
complicated functions and activities of the [Su- 
preme Court] . . . and his role as a supervisor of 
the Federal courts throughout the country.”l6 
His “lasting monument” was that he “laid the 
foundation for a reorganization of the judicial 
administration in this country.”l7 Friend and 
foe alike acknowledged that Tafi “simplified and 
expedited the processes of the [Supreme] court 
and greatly improved the administration ofjus- 
tice in the Federal courts.”l8 As Charles Evans 
Hughes accurately observed, Taft’s career “fit- 
tingly culminated in his work as Chief Justice,” 
because the “efficient administration of justice 
was, after all, the dominant interest of his pub- 
lic life.”l9 
Hughes’ observation suggests an impor- 
tant distinction between Associate Justices and 
a Chief Justice. The primary task of Associate 
Justices is to decide cases and deliver opin- 
ions, whereas the work of the Chief Justice also 
includes administrative responsibilities for the 
judicial branch of the federal government. 
Taft’s current obscurity strongly indicates 
that enduring professional reputation de- 
pends upon the former task, but not the lat- 
ter. Indeed, when Frankfurter praised Taft 
as a great “law reformer” and accorded him 
“a place in history . . . next to Oliver Ellsworth, 
who originally devised the judicial system,”zo 
he unwittingly revealed what a very small place 
that is. 
It is, however, a place whose comers I shall 
attempt to illuminate. This paper shall assess 
Taft’s contributions as Chief Justice, rather than 
his general jurisprudence as expressed through 
his opinions. It is my hope that by so doing an 
important but largely overlooked aspect of our 
judicial history may be excavated. In particular, 
I shall examine both the birth of the effort to 
subject federal courts to a regime of efficient 
judicial management, and the simultaneous ori- 
gin of important tensions between this regime 
and traditional American norms ofjudicial dis- 
interest. 
I 
The distinct characteristics of the office of 
Chief Justicewere forcibly impressed upon Tat? 
almost immediately after his appointment. 
Harding nominated Taft on June 30,192 1, and 
the Senate confirmed Taft on that same day. At 
the time Taft was in Montreal, sitting as an arbi- 
trator to determine the value of the Grand Trunk 
Railway Company, which was being national- 
ized by the Canadian government.21 Taft jour- 
neyed to Washington to take the oath of office 
at the Department of Justice on July 12. Re- 
turning to Canada to his summer home in Murray 
Bay, Quebec, he was telegraphed on July 30 by 
Justice Joseph McKenna, the Senior Associ- 
ate Justice, that Deputy Clerk Henry McKenney 
had passed away.22 
This posed a serious difficulty for the Court, 
because its Clerk, James D. Maher, had died on 
June 3. At the time, federal law provided that 
the Clerk could only be appointed by the 
Court.23 If the Clerk died, the Deputy Clerk 
could “perform the duties of the clerk in his 
name until a clerk is appointed and quali- 
fied.”24 With the death of Deputy Clerk 
McKenney, however, the Clerk’s ofice was, as 
Assistant Clerk William R. Stansbury tele- 
graphed Taft, “now without an official head and 
no one authorized to issue official papers.”25 
Yet a Court could not be gathered to appoint a 
new Clerk. 
Taft promptly returned to Washington to 
meet with McKenna. Telegraphic consultation 
with those Associate Justices who could be 
contacted proved unhelpful, which, as Taft 
wrote, “only shows what McKenna assured 
me that the other members of the Court expect 
me to attend to the executive business of the 
Court and not bother them.” McKenna im- 
pressed the point on his new Chief: “McKenna 
said I must realize that the Chief Justiceship 
was an office distinct from that of the Associ- 
ates in executive control and was intended to 
be and all of the Associates recognized it, that 
in judicial decisions all were equal but in man- 
agement I must act and they would all stand by 
if ever question was made.”26 Taft boldly and 
promptly resolved “to do something without 
statutory authority”27 and appoint Stansbury 
“de facto deputy clerk,”2* exacting “a common 
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law bond from him to protect everybody.”29 He 
had learned a valuable lesson about the dis- 
tinction and prerogatives of the Chief Justice- 
ship. 
Chief Justices are typically evaluated as to 
how well they employ these prerogatives to 
administer the day-to-day functioning of the 
Court. They are scrutinized for their handling 
of small emergencies, like the death of Deputy 
Clerk McKenney, and for their ability to dis- 
pose efficiently of routinized institutional ne- 
cessities like assigning opinions or moderating 
the Court’s Conferences. Measured by these 
standards, it is clear that Taft was a highly suc- 
cessful Chief Justice. He was ruthlessly effi- 
cient, moving heaven and earth to force the 
Court to diminish its embarrassingly large back- 
log of cases. Louis D. Brandeis remarked to 
Felix Frankfurter that Taft, “like the Steel Cor- 
poration, is attaining [all] time production 
records.”30 In the popular press it was said of 
Taft that “The spirit of speed and efficiency 
lurlang in the corpulent form of an ex-President 
of the United States has entered the Court and 
broken up its old lethargy.”g* 
Within the Court the dominant image of 
Taft was not that of a disciplinarian, but rather 
of a man who could dispose “of executive 
details . . . easily” and “get through them with- 
out friction.”32 “The new Chief Justice makes 
the work very pleasant,” Holmes said. “He is 
always good natured and carries things along 
with a smile or a laugh. (It makes a devil of a 
difference if the C.J.’s temperament diminishes 
friction.) He is very open to suggestions and 
appreciates the labors of others. I rather think 
the other JJ. are as pleased as I am.”33 Brandeis 
concurred in this positive assessment: 
On the personal side the present C.J. 
has admirable qualities, a great im- 
provement on the late C.J.; he 
smoothes out difficulties instead of 
making them. It’s astonishing he 
should have been such a horribly bad 
President, for he has considerable 
executive ability. The fact, probably, 
is that he cared about law all the time 
and nothing else. He has an excellent 
memory, makes quick decisions on ques- 
tions of administration that arise and if 
a large output were the chief 
desideratum, he would be very good.34 
Taft’s genial and winning personality was par- 
ticularly useful in managing the Court’s poten- 
tially contentious conferences. Holmes said 
that “The meetings are perhaps pleasanter than 
I ever have known them - thanks largely to 
the C.J.”35. The Justices also appreciated how 
“fairly” Taft distributed case assignments.36 
Indeed, Harlan Fiske Stone later remarked that 
“there was never a Chief Justice as generous to 
his brethren in the assignment of cases.”37 
Most important, however, Taft exercised a natu- 
ral leadership within the Court.38 As Augustus 
Hand wrote to him: 
You have a certain leadership in the 
Court that is enormously important and 
I don’t believe has ever existed since 
the times of Marshall himself. Indeed I 
think Brandeis, in the left wing, greatly 
appreciates this and knows how much 
it means to have a C.J. whom the Court 
will in certain respects follow and at any 
rate will “rally around.”39 
Supervising the ongoing institutional rou- 
tines of the Court in this manner has been an 
essential task of every Chief Justice since 
Marshall. Some Chief Justices, like Taft, have 
fulfilled these challenges more successfully 
than others, but all Chief Justices have under- 
stood and accepted these obligations of their 
office. Tafi’s unique accomplishment, however, 
is that he managed to expand the very concept 
of the Chief Justiceship, so that his successors 
have also in part been judged by their responses 
to responsibilities not even perceptible before 
Taft. “It is certain,” Robert Steamer writes in 
his study of the Chief Justiceship, “that the 
office was never quite the same after he left 
it.”40 My concern in this paper will be with the 
question of how Taft transformed the role of 
Chief Justice, and my contention will be that he 
did so by endowing it with a distinctive mana- 
gerial outlook, one that he had acquired as Chief 
Executive of the nation. 
This claim may sound strange, given Taft’s 
notorious inadequacies as President. Taft 
readily admitted that as President he felt “just a 
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bit like a fish out of water,”41 and that he was 
“not fond of politics.”42 It was said of Taft that 
as President he constituted “a very large body 
completely surrounded by  politician^."^^ In- 
deed, Taft’s reputation as a politician was so 
very bad that he could effectively mock Sena- 
tor William Borah’s denunciation of Taft’s own 
nomination as Harding’s effort “to take a politi- 
cian . . . and put him on the Supreme Bench in 
the interest of party politics”:44 
I seem to have heard a suggestion, 
by way of friendly criticism, when my 
name was up for the Chief Justiceship, 
that a politician was being put upon the 
bench. All I have to say is, that that 
was news to me (renewed and increas- 
ing laughter), and I think it was news to 
the people.45 
Yet while Taft may have been, as William 
Allen White trenchantly put it, “innocent of 
po l i t i~s ,”~~ he was always a capable adminis- 
trator, determined to improve the efficient man- 
agement of the executive And it is 
this perspective that Taft brought with him into 
the Chief Justiceship. Most specifically, Taft 
viewed the federal judiciary as a coherent 
branch of government to be managed, and he 
viewed the Chief Justiceship as the source of 
that management. This perspective was fun- 
damentally new, and its implications were pro- 
found. 
In the next section, I should like to unfold 
some of the most salient consequences of this 
perspective for Taft’s reworking of the position 
of the Chief Justiceship in its relationship to 
the federal judiciary and to the Congress. 
I1 
The most obvious expression of Taft’s vi- 
sion of the federal judiciary was the Act of Sep- 
tember 14, 1922,48 which, as Felix Frankfurter 
and James Landis have accurately noted, 
marked “the beginning of a new chapter in the 
administration of the federal courts.”49 The 
Act not only authorized the Chief Justice to 
assign district court judges temporarily to sit 
wherever in the country the needs of  the 
docket were greatest,50 but it also created a 
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges to “ad- 
vise as to . . . any matters in respect of which 
the administration ofjustice in the courts of the 
United States may be improved,” and in par- 
ticular to “make a comprehensive survey of the 
condition of business in the courts of the United 
States and prepare plans for assignment and 
transfer ofjudges to or from circuits or districts 
where the state of the docket or condition of 
business indicates the need therefor.”51 The 
effect of the Act, as Taft observed, was to in- 
troduce “into ourjudicial system. . . an execu- 
tive principle to secure effective teamwork,” so 
that “judicial force” could be deployed “eco- 
nomically and at the points where most 
needed.”52 In Taft’s view, the primary virtue of 
the Act was to empower the Chief Justice and 
the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges “tem- 
porarily to mass the force of the judiciary where 
the arrears are greatest.”53 
Taft had been advocating a reform like this 
for years,54 and there was little doubt among 
contemporaries that the ultimate shape of the 
statute, as well as its enactment, were “largely 
the result” of his “active advocacy.”55 Taft lob- 
bied hard for the bill, effectively mobilizing his 
numerous contacts within Congress, and he 
rightly received the lion’s share of the credit for 
the results.56 Four aspects of the Act of Sep- 
tember 14,1922, require emphasis, because each 
embodies an outlook on the federal judicial 
branch that reflects the influence of Taft’s ex- 
perience as President. 
First, and most fundamentally, the Act im- 
plied “a functional unification of the United 
States judiciary.”57 Just as the executive branch 
has always been seen as an integrated whole, 
directed by the President, the Act for the first 
time conceptualized federal judges as also inte- 
grated into a single, coherent branch of the fed- 
eral government designed to attain functional 
objectives. Previously, as Frankfurter has ob- 
served, “federal judges throughout the coun- 
try were entirely autonomous, little indepen- 
dent sovereigns. Every judge had his own little 
principality. He was the boss within his district, 
and his district was his only concern.”58 The 
Act, in contrast, “organized” the “whole judi- 
cial force . . . as a unit, with authority to send 
expeditions to spots needing aid.”59 
This idea may seem obvious to us today, 
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but in 1922 it provoked great resistance. No 
less a judge than Henry D. Clayton (after whom 
the Clayton Act was named) attacked the Act 
as manifesting “a dictatorial power over the 
courts unrecognized in our jurisprudence.”60 
Clayton objected to “the war idea of mobilizing 
judges under a supreme commander as soldiers 
are massed and ordered.” He argued that 
“judges are not soldiers but servants, and the 
people only are the masters whom they serve.”6’ 
To protests like these, Taft responded with 
the brutal and implacable language of instru- 
mental rationality. Although he conceded that 
“in the judicial work a judge does on the bench, 
he must be independent,” Taft insisted that “in 
the disposition of his time and the cases he is 
to hear, he should be subject to a judicial coun- 
cil that makes him a cog in the machine and 
makes him work with all the others to dispose 
of the business which courts are organized to 
do.”62 The premise that judges are “organized” 
to accomplish a collective function renders the 
In the mind of 
Chief Justice Taft 
(pictured), the 
Chief Justice, 
using the Confer- 
ence of Senior 
Circuit Judges as a 
kind of cabinet, 
was responsible for 
the management 
of the judicial 
branch, just as the 
President was 




successor, C h arks  
Evans Hughes, 




federal judiciary structurally parallel to an ex- 
ecutive agency, which is conceptualized accord- 
ing to a similar logic. 
Second, if judges are “cogs in a machine,” 
there must also exist some intelligence that di- 
rects the machine. Organizations require guid- 
ance, and the functional unification of the judi- 
ciary thus implied that the judicial branch be 
subject to “the executive management” of “a 
head charged with the responsibility of the use 
of the judicial force at places and under condi- 
tions where judicial force is needed.”63 In this 
way the Act transformed the federal judiciary 
from an “entirely headless and decentralized” 
institution,@ into one capable of “executive su- 
pervision.”65 
Taft defended this transformation as merely 
a matter of “introducing into the administration 
of justice the ordinary business principles in 
successful executive work.”66 He argued that 
the massive increase in federal litigation re- 
quired that “we must approach the problems of 
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its disposition in the same way that the head of 
a great industrial establishment approaches the 
question of the manufacture of the amount that 
he will need, to meet the demand for the goods 
which he makes.”67 But in fact the necessity of 
executive supervision was also central to Taft’s 
conception of the President as ultimately re- 
sponsible for the “administrative control” of 
the executive branch.68 In Taft’s mind the Chief 
Justice, using the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges as a kind of cabinet, was responsible 
for the management of the judicial branch, just 
as the President was responsible for the man- 
agement of the executive branch.69 
The managerial obligations that Tafl im- 
ported into the office of Chief Justice were not 
exhausted by the operation of the Conference. 
Taft enthusiastically embraced a sense of ge- 
neric responsibility for the over-all functioning 
of the federal judiciary. Exemplary are the let- 
ters Taft would write to judges who had failed 
to decide submitted cases for unconscionably 
long periods of time: 
I write in the interest of the adminis- 
tration ofjustice, and for the reputation 
of the Federal Judiciary, that you dis- 
pose of the patent case, which you now 
must have had at hand and submitted 
to you for more than four years. . . . I 
write this letter with no assumption that 
I may exercise direct authority over you 
in the discharge of your duties, but as 
the head of the Federal Judiciary I feel 
that I do have the right to appeal to you, 
in its interest and in the interest of the 
public whom it is created to serve, to 
end this indefensible situation.70 
To accept forthrightly managerial respon- 
sibility in this way is not merely to seize the 
potential of executive supervision, but also to 
create lines of accountability. For this reason 
Chief Justice Hughes, when the Court in the 
1930s was subject to withering political assaults, 
chose to diminish the exposure and vulnerabil- 
ity of such an aggressive managerial posture 
by seeking as Chief Justice to decentralize fed- 
eral judicial adrnini~tration.~] But Taft, in the 
full flush of progressive reform and personal 
popularity, had no such qualms. 
Third, Taft knew that the management of 
the judicial branch would require the exercise 
of the deeply human virtues of leadership, in- 
spiration, and a commitment to what Taft re- 
peatedly called “teamwork, uniformity in action 
and an interest by all the judges in the work of 
each district.”7* Taft viewed the Conference of 
Senior Circuit Judges as a means for serving 
these various management functions. The Con- 
ference “is a good thing,” said Taft, because it 
“solidifies the Federal Judiciary” and “brings 
all the district judges within a mild disciplinary 
circle, and makes them feel that they are under 
real observation by the other judges and the 
c~untry.’’~~ The Conference was also a method 
of gathering information about the state of the 
federal judiciary, of collecting both statistical 
and narrative data. And the Conference was a 
tool for “trying to come in touch with the Fed- 
eral Judges of the country, so that we may feel 
more allegiance to a team and do more team- 
work.”74 The Conference could generate the 
“esprit” that came from close coordination.75 
The Conference, however, was only one tool 
for exercising executive leadership. In fact, Taft 
seized the opportunity for such leadership in 
all his dealings with federal judges. He was al- 
ways “glad to keep in touch with the District 
Judges,” because “they are the wheel horses 
of our system, and I want them to know that 
they have the deepest sympathy in their ef- 
forts in the dispatch of business.”76 He would 
write to a Circuit Judge requesting “a long gos- 
sipy letter so that I may acquire intimate knowl- 
edge of the situation.”77 District Judges 
throughout the nation deeply appreciated this 
attention and care, and they wrote to Taft ex- 
pressing their pleasure.78 Learned Hand, for 
example, said to Taft that “It is a great comfort 
to know the interest that you take. To be frank, 
we have never felt it before your incumbency.”79 
As a good executive, Taft wished “to have all 
the members of the Federal Judiciary realize that 
we are remanded to the top, and that whatever 
we can do here in Washington to help, we will 
do.”*O 
Fourth, the corollary of the functional uni- 
fication of the federal judiciary was that the 
judicial branch could now articulate its ongo- 
ing and routinized requirements to the legisla- 
ture, just as did the executive branch. The Con- 
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ference was the perfect institutional vehicle for 
this articulation, and Taft conceived it as en- 
abling “the judiciary to express itself in respect 
of certain subjects in such a way as to be help- 
ful to Congress.”8* Taft rapidly and effectively 
molded the Conference into a voice for the in- 
stitutional needs of the judicial branch.82 As 
he accurately reported to the Conference in 
1925: “The recommendations of this Confer- 
ence have a good deal of influence. I mean that 
they are accepted as matters for serious con- 
sideration.”*3 
Taft was unwilling, however, to regard the 
Conference as the exclusive voice of the judi- 
ciary.% He believed quite strongly that the Chief 
Justice was the primary national spokesman for 
the cause of the administration of justice, and 
he therefore sought to maintain an active per- 
sonal presence in Congress in matters that tran- 
scended the pronouncements of the Confer- 
ence.85 In this regard Taft hnctioned as an 
independent lobbyist for a legislative agenda, 
much as he would have as Chief Executive.86 It 
is to this aspect of Taft’s conception of the 
chiefjusticeship that I would now like to turn. 
111 
From the very outset of his chief justice- 
ship, Taft “thought that it was part of my duty” 
as the head of the federal judiciary, “to suggest 
needed reforms, and to become rather active in 
pressing them before” C0ngress.8~ Taft was 
quite aware that this was a new conception of 
his office. “I don’t think the former Chief Jus- 
tice had so much to do in the matter of legisla- 
tion as I have,” he wrote to his brother Horace, 
but “I don’t object to it, because I think Chief 
Justices ought to take part in that.”88 
Throughout his service on the Court Taft 
was a frequent witness before congressional 
committees, lobbying hard for judicial reforms. 
Taft’s relentless determination “to keep press- 
ing” Congress for legislation89 began almost 
immediately after he assumed office. On Octo- 
ber 5, 192 1, he testified before the Senate Judi- 
ciary Committee in support of the Act of Sep- 
tember 14, 1922. He realized that he had “vio- 
lated the precedent in doing this,” but he was 
unfazed, because “I am determined to exercise 
such influence as I have to help the judicial 
system of the country. Precedents that keep 
the judges away from committees who are to 
help are not precedents that appeal to me.”9* 
By March 30, 1922, in the course of testifying 
before the House Judiciary Committee in favor 
of bills to enlarge the certiorari jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court and to reform the compen- 
sation of the Court Reporter, Taft could com- 
fortably remark that “I hate to be in the attitude 
of a continual beggar from Congress, but I seem 
to have arrived at the court just when it was 
necessary.”gl 
Taft did not hesitate to draft his colleagues 
on the Court to assist in his lobbying efforts. In 
1926, for example, he brought Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis with him to make the case before 
a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations 
Committee for a deficiency appropriation to 
enable the First Circuit to purchase an urgently 
needed bar library. “I wanted to bring some big 
guns to bear,” Taft explained. “I am a constant 
visitor and I did not consider that I had influ- 
ence enough. This is a real emergency.”92 
The presence of Taft’s political foes on con- 
gressional committees, particularly in the Sen- 
ate, sometimes rendered his persona1 testimony 
counter-productive. In pressing for the legis- 
lation reforming the Supreme Court’s jurisdic- 
tion, for example, Taft learned from Senator 
Cummins that “some of my old enemies on the 
[Senate Judiciary] committee rather resent my 
being prominent in pressing legislation. They 
want me to ‘shinny on my own side.”’93 So Taft 
shrewdly selected Justices Willis Van Devanter, 
James C. McReynolds, and George Sutherland 
to speak in his pla~e.9~ Taft testified instead 
before the House Judiciary Committee.95 
It is clear, then, that Taft did not regard the 
chief justiceship as an accommodating civil 
servant, essentially passive although ready to 
provide helpfid advice when requested by com- 
petent legislative authorities. Taft instead un- 
derstood the position as analogous to an ex- 
ecutive official fully authorized to conceive and 
“push” a legislative agenda. He realized that 
the responsibility of managing the judicial 
branch carried within it the ancillary responsi- 
bility of promoting legislative reforms that 
would ensure the effectiveness of such man- 
agement. The logic of this position remains 
manifest to this day. Chief Justice William H. 
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Rehnquist, for example, in a recent annual ad- 
dress on “the state of the judiciary” -an ad- 
dress whose deliberate evocation of the 
President’s annual State of the Union address 
would have been inconceivable before Taft’s 
transformation of the chief justiceship4hose 
to stress the proposition that the federal courts 
and Congress “must work together if feasible 
solutions are to be found to the practical prob- 
lems that confront today’s federal judiciary.”96 
A small but telling example of the energetic 
and comprehensive manner in which Taft pur- 
sued this aspect of the chiefjusticeship may be 
found in the history of Public Law No. 563, 
which ended the practice in federal courts of 
charging defendants with a fee to receive cop- 
ies of their own indictments.97 
In November 1925, Taft received a letter 
from Joseph Coursey, an unknown lawyer from 
South Dakota, complaining of “the failure of 
Federal law . . . to provide a copy of the charge 
to the defendant. . . . It seems to me it should be 
almost fundamental that a defendant be given 
as a matter of right a copy of the accusation 
against him.”98 Taft responded by asking 
Coursey whether the charge for the indictment 
was imposed “by law, or whether it rests in a 
local rule of practice.”99 Coursey answered that 
he did “not know whether the rule is one of law 
When Taft received a 
complaint from a 
provincial lawyer 
that the government 
did not provide a 
copy of the indict- 
ment to a defendant, 





cautions that doing so 
would place a 
financial and 
bureaucratic burden 
on the government, 
Taft asked Senator 
Albert Cummins 
(left), Chair of the 
Senate Judiciary 
Committee, to 
prepare a bill 
remedying the 
matter. 
or practice but I know positively that in this 
District we can not obtain such a copy without 
paying for it except in two cases: namely-if 
the defendant is charged with homicide or will 
make a pauper showing.”’oo 
Taft then wrote to Solicitor General William 
Mitchell, asking him to find out “whether it is 
the practice to fwnish defendants with copies 
of the indictment.” He enclosed Coursey’s let- 
ter, adding “I am rather inclined to think that he 
has a good case, and that the defendant should 
be given a copy, at the expense of the Govem- 
ment.’’IO’ Mitchell sent back a detailed, six-page 
letter, explaining that federal statutes currently 
required clerks “to charge the accused for cop- 
ies of the indictments, except in cases involv- 
ing capital offenses,” and that courts had 
deemed the requirements of the Sixth Amend- 
ment satisfied “by the formality of reading the 
indictment to [the defendant] when he is ar- 
raigned.” Mitchell went on to caution that “if 
clerks are directed generally to furnish copies 
of the indictments without charge to the ac- 
cused, it would greatly increase the volume of 
work to be performed in the clerk’s office, par- 
ticularly on account of the large number of 
cases under the National Prohibition Act, and 
that the clerks’ offices are now shorthanded as 
the result of lack of adequate appropriation.”l02 
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Not deterred by Mitchell’s warning, Taft 
wrote to Senator Albert Cummins, Chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, explaining the situ- 
ation and commenting that “I should think . . . 
that the Government ought to furnish, at its 
own expense, indictments to defendants.”l03 
Taft viewed the question as one ofjustice, rather 
than constitutional compulsion, and he dis- 
missed the potential bureaucratic burden with 
the observation that clerks could easily type 
indictments in triplicate. Cummins agreed with 
Taft’s assessment, and he asked Taft to “pre- 
pare a Bill relating to furnishing copies of in- 
dictments to defendants and send it to me. I 
will be glad to introduce it.”104 
Taft requested that Mitchell draft a bill, 
which the Solicitor General did, noting that 
“those in charge of the appropriations for the 
Department of Justice have estimated that” the 
bill would “substantially increase the expenses 
of operating the offices of the clerks of the 
courts. . . . I have explained, however, that this 
Bill is not being furnished you as a Department 
measure, but merely as the result of a personal 
request for a document to supply Senator 
Cummins’ wants.”IO5 Taft forwarded Mitchell’s 
draft to Cummins, who agreed to “introduce 
the bill and have it referred to the Committee.”Io6 
The result was Public Law No. 563, which be- 
came law in January 1927. 
That Taft would take the time to evaluate 
the complaint of an unknown, unsophisticated, 
and provincial lawyer, that he would summon 
the energy and will to remedy that complaint in 
the face of bureaucratic opposition, that he 
could command the personal respect and as- 
sistance of leaders in the executive and legisla- 
tive branches in this task, all reveal much about 
Taft’s construction of the role of Chief Justice. 
In Taft’s eyes, the chief justiceship was much 
closer in spirit and responsibility to the English 
position of Lord Chancellor, an executive offi- 
cial whose portfolio included the administra- 
tion of justice, than to any previous American 
model of a federal judge. 
The English model of an executive judicial 
official did not, however, fit easily into Ameri- 
can circumstances. Reform in the American 
context often required political mobilization, 
which potentially conflicted with traditional 
American norms of judicial nonpartisanship. 
Taft was keenly aware of this tension. When 
Taft became Chief Justice he gave up an edito- 
rial column in which he had commented regu- 
larly on current events, stating: 
The degree in which a judge should 
separate himself from general activities 
as a citizen and a member of the commu- 
nity is not usually fixed by statutory law 
but by a due sense of propriety, consid- 
ering the nature of his office, and by 
well-established custom. Certainly, in 
this country at least, a judge should keep 
out of politics and out of any diversion 
or avocation which may involve him in 
politics. It is one of those characteristic 
queer inconsistencies in the British ju- 
dicial system, which was the forerunner 
of our own, that the highest judicial of- 
ficer in Great Britain, the Lord Chancel- 
lor, is often very much in politics and 
has always been.’”’ 
The passage is noteworthy because it casts a 
wistful glance at the office of the English Lord 
Chancellor at the very moment that it acknowl- 
edges distinctively American obligations of 
judicial disinterest. 
Despite his good intentions, Taft very 
quickly found that he could not contain his 
“bursting expression.”l08 He believed that he 
could reconcile his commitment to law reform 
with American judicial norms by speaking out 
only to bar associations in order to mobilize 
them to lobby in support of measures for the 
reform of the administration ofjustice. “One of 
the most important extra curriculum things 
that I have to do as Chief Justice,” he said, is 
“to organize the Bench and the Bar into a 
united group in this country dedicated to 
the cause of the improvement ofjudicial pro- 
cedure.”l09 Elihu Root in fact commented to 
Taft that he was “the first Chief Justice to fully 
appreciate the dynamics of the Bar as an orga- 
nization. If a national bar spirit can be created it 
will have an immense effect upon the adminis- 
tration of justice.”’lO 
Taft began his program of mobilizing the 
bar almost immediately upon taking office. On 
August 30, 1921, he spoke to the Judicial Sec- 
tion of the American Bar Association, seeking 
60 JOURNAL 1998, VOL. I 
support for what would later become the Act 
of September 14, 1922.l1l Four months later, 
he spoke to the Chicago Bar Association, seek- 
ing support for the Act, as well as for the sim- 
plification of federal procedure and the expan- 
sion of certiorari jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court.ll* These speeches were criticized on the 
floor of the United States Senate as “different 
from those made by any other Chief Justice.’’Ll3 
Senator William J. Harris of Georgia opined 
that “the judiciary is going to be injured, and 
the people will not have the same high respect 
for it if the Chief Justice and associate justices 
of the Supreme Court of the United States make 
speeches in public not in their line of duty as 
has been done recently.”‘l4 
Taft, however, was defiant. Three days later 
he shot back in an address to the New York 
County Bar Association: 
I venture to think that there are some 
things that a judge may speak of and 
may discuss in public and not use a ju- 
dicial opinion for the purpose. The sub- 
ject is that of law reform. From the earli- 
est traditions of the English bench from 
which we get our customs, the judges 
of the highest courts of Great Britain 
have taken an interest in and a part in 
the formulation of legislation for better- 
ing the administration of justice. They 
have written and spoken on such sub- 
jects with entire freedom and without 
incurring criticism. You doubtless re- 
member that in Campbell’s Lives of the 
Lord Chancellors and the Chief Justices, 
a part of the story of each life is work 
done in law reform. Measures of this 
sort that are put through in England are 
Taft prevailed on his 
brother, Henry W. 
Taft (left), to help 
rouse opposition to 
S. 3151, a bill that 
stripped federal 
district courts of 
both federal 
question jurisdic- 
tion and diversity 
jurisdiction. Despite 
being an influential 
member of the New 
York bar and a 
named partner at 
Cadwalader, 
Wickersham & Taft, 
Henry was ineffec- 
tive at generating 
publicity in the 
influential New 
York newspapers. 
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usually prepared by the law oficers of 
the government and sometimes by the 
Lord Chancellor himself. The judges of 
the Supreme Court have taken an active 
part in the discussion of the measures 
as they go through their legislative 
course. And why should it not be so? 
With their attention constantly directed 
toward the workings of the machinery 
of the administration ofjustice, they are 
at a more advantageous point of obser- 
vation and if they use their opportuni- 
ties, are better able to make recommen- 
dations with respect to law reform than 
any other class in the community.115 
Taft never did retreat from his program of mo- 
bilizing political support for the cause of judi- 
cial reform. He understood well enough that 
American judges were appropriately reluctant 
to engage “in extra-judicial activities” because 
they might be cast into positions “actually or 
seemingly inconsistent with absolute impartial- 
ity in the discharge o f .  . . judicial duties.”I16 
But, explicitly invoking the precedent of the 
English Chancellors, Taft apparently believed 
that advocacy of judicial reform would not 
compromise his judicial impartiality because, 
as he said, he could “discuss” this subject “in 
public and not use a judicial opinion for the 
purpose.” As a good child of the Progressive 
era, Taft seemingly regarded judicial reform as 
purely technical and apolitical.117 
But of course in the American context any 
such belief is merely naive, and so in at least 
two distinct ways Taft’s public advocacy some- 
times threw him perilously close to violating 
judicial norms of disinterested neutrality. First, 
in America there was simply no clear line dis- 
tinguishing judicial reform from partisan poli- 
tics. This can perhaps best be illustrated by 
Taft’s opposition to S. 3151, a bill sponsored 
by Progressive Republican Senator George 
Norris of Nebraska and strongly supported by 
Democratic Senator Thomas Walsh of Mon- 
tana, who was later selected by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt as Attorney General. The bill 
stripped federal district courts of both federal 
question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdic- 
tion.118 By a stroke of great irony, Norris, who 
thoroughly disliked federal court-he had ac- 
tually once proposed abolishing all federal 
courts except the Supreme Courtl19-was the 
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Re- 
markably, S. 3 15 1 was reported favorably by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee without even a 
hearing.120 
Taft was appalled by what he regarded as 
“the remarkable effort made in the Senate by 
Norris and Walsh to emasculate the jurisdic- 
tion of the Federal trial courts . . . and to sneak 
it through without the country’s being advised 
about it.”l21 He saw the bill as “a great attack 
on the administration of justice in this coun- 
try,”122 the “most radical bill affecting the use- 
fulness and efficacy of the Federal Judiciary 
that I remember ever to have heard sug- 
gested.”l23 Taft threw himself into the task of 
“trying to save the life of the Federal Judi- 
ciary.”124 
It quickly became apparent, however, that 
Taft’s opposition to S. 3 15 1 could not be con- 
fined to the nonpartisan expression of exper- 
tise. Thus when Taft wrote “to sound an alarm 
on the subject” to his friend Casper Yost, edi- 
tor of the influential St. Louis Globe-Democrat, 
he cautioned that “I am so situated that I can 
not take a political part, but . . . I invoke your 
influence in maintaining the protective power 
which citizens may secure from the Federal Ju- 
diciary in defense of their rights.”I25 Yost re- 
sponded by publishing a lively editorial.126 
That Taft thoroughly understood and was 
willing to exploit the explosive politics of S. 3 15 1 
is evident from a letter he sent to his brother, 
Henry W. Taft, an influential member of the New 
York Bar,127 urging him to begin a public cam- 
paign against the bill: 
Now my own judgment about this 
bill is that ifNorris tries to get it through, 
and is supported by the Democrats, it 
will prove to be dynamite in the next 
campaign. It will rouse every negro in 
the United States, and they cast a great 
many votes now in the large cities since 
they have moved north, and when it 
becomes known to them that they can 
not resort to the local Federal courts, 
they will certainly be convinced, as they 
ought to be, that they are suffering a 
practical deprivation of their Federal 
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Although Taft tried to keep-out of t h e  political 
debate over bill S. 3151, Senator Royal Copeland 
of New York (above) told his colleagues on the 
Senate floor that the Chief Justice opposed it. 
The bill was amended to restore federal ques- 
tion jurisdiction. 
rights and protection. I think you ought 
to go to the New York Times and to the 
Tribune and explain the effect of the bill 
and have editorials printed on the sub- 
ject. Reference to the negroes will find 
an echo, and I am quite sure that the 
Times will feel like warning the Demo- 
cratic party against any such radical 
measure. I think you ought to bring it to 
Hilles’ attention and that the opposi- 
tion to it ought to be made a plank in the 
National Republican Platform.128 
When Henry proved inept in generating 
publicity, paralyzed by Charles Evans Hughes’ 
fear that anything “coming from New York” 
would be dismissed as reflecting “Wall Street 
interests,”1z9 Taft lost patience.I30 “What I was 
anxious to do,” he explained, “was to head the 
movement by an announcement in the New York 
Times, for there are a great many people who 
look to the Times as a kind of Bible.”131 Henry 
accepted the “rebuke” and promptly contacted 
Rollo Ogden, editor of The New York Times. 132 
On April 22 the Sunday Times published an 
editorial strongly opposing the bi11.133 
The fierce controversy that surrounded S. 
3 15 1 simultaneously concerned politics and the 
administration of justice; the two were insepa- 
rably combined. Taft knew that he could not 
risk overt involvement, yet his name and views 
figured prominently in the debate. On the floor 
of the Senate, for example, Senator Royal 
Copeland of New York, seeking to have the bill 
remanded to the Committee for hearings, ob- 
served that “I am advised by the attorneys who 
have spoken to me that the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court feels that the bill is not a good 
bill in some respect~.”13~ In its editorial, The 
New York Times specifically referred to this 
comment, remarking that “It is no secret, since 
the fact was stated in the Senate by Mr. 
Copeland ofNew York, that the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court regards some of the fea- 
tures of this bill as most undesirable and harm- 
fu1.”135 Two weeks later, Senator Duncan 
Fletcher of Florida had reprinted in the Con- 
gressional Record an editorial in the American 
Bar Association Journal strongly opposing S. 
3 15 1 ,  which relied heavily on arguments attrib- 
uted to Taft,’36 as well as an editorial from the 
Florida Times Union that opposed the bill in 
part on the grounds that “the Chief Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court. , . is reported 
to have said that this bill has features that can 
be regarded only as most undesirable and harm- 
As a result of the accumulating pressure, 
Norris was forced to amend his bill to restore 
federal question jurisdiction.l38 Taft wrote 
Henry, “I think Norris has heard a good deal 
about his proposed changes, and . . . he does 
not find them so easy to push through as he 
thought he would, in view of the agitation you 
have all stirred up on the subject.’’139 Norris’ 
revised bill eventually stalled in the Senate. Yet 
Tafi’s intense struggle to defeat it illustrated 
the uneasy line between disinterested law re- 
form and unabashedly political mobilization. 
The second reason why Taft’s appeal to an 
English model of an executive judicial official 
was dangerous in the American context con- 
fUl.”l37 
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cerned the institution of judicial review. Each 
time Taft became involved in legislative reform, 
he risked prejudging the constitutionality of 
proposed legislation. This potential lurked even 
in the most technical and benign measures. The 
point can be illustrated by Taft’s involvement 
in the passage of a bill that transferred jurisdic- 
tion of patent appeals from the Court of Ap- 
peals of the District of Columbia to the Court of 
Customs Appeals. Taft strongly supported the 
bill, to the extent that Acting Commissioner of 
Patents William A. Kinnan could in congres- 
sional hearings testify that “There has been no 
objection anywhere. It has been indicated that 
the Chief Justice of the United States has looked 
into it and approved it. It seems to me to be an 
efficiency measure.”l40 
Taft wrote to Senator Thomas Walsh on May 
8, 1928, urging approval of the bill on the 
grounds that the District Court of Appeals was 
“very much burdened with business,” while the 
Court of Customs Appeals did “not have 
enough to Despite his ongoing 
struggle with Walsh over S. 3151, Taft was 
sweetly and nonpartisanly solicitous: “I am 
sorry to impose on you, my dear Senator, 
another burden, but as I understand you are 
on the committee for the consideration ofthis 
bill, I venture thus to write to you. It will cer- 
tainly help the administration of justice in the 
Most striking from a modern point 
of view, however, is that Taft included in his 
letter a long defense of the bill’s constitutional- 
ity, which began: 
I understand that there are two per- 
sons who think that the bill is unconsti- 
tutional. I can not for the life of me un- 
derstand how any such doubt could 
arise. The Court of Customs Appeals is 
a purely statutory court, and Congress 
is not limited in any way in the hnc- 
tions which it gives to it.143 
Walsh replied to Taft that he would “make an 
effort to have the matter put in” shape for ap- 
prova1,144 and the bill, seemingly uncon- 
troversial, was enacted into law March 2, 
1929.145 
It is remarkable that Taft would submit an 
advisory opinion about the constitutionality 
In order to make clear his suppport for a bill 
that transferred jurisdiction of patent appeals 
from the Court of Appeals of the District of Co- 
lumbia to the Court of Customs Appeals, Taft 
wrote to Senator Thomas Walsh (above), the 
most influential Democrat on the Senate Judi- 
ciary Committee, outlining why he thought the 
bill was constitutional. Apparently, the Chief 
Justice felt free to give constitutional advice to a 
political opponent. 
of a statute to a Senator who was in many ways 
his archopponent. It indicates how unembar- 
rassed Taft must have felt about the practice. 
Apparently he regarded the constitutional is- 
sues posed by the statute as uncontroversial 
and settled. But constitutional judgment in the 
United States is seldom a secure thing. Taft 
premised his argument on the fact that the Court 
of Customs Appeals was an Article I court, yet 
within only thirty years Congress would itself 
declare the (now renamed) Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals an Article I11 a 
conclusion sustained by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.147 
In this country, as distinct from England, 
the institution of judicial review renders advi- 
sory opinions dangerously uncertain, and this 
poses a powerful dilemma for a Chief Justice 
who would accept responsibility for pushing a 
JOURNAL 1998, VOL. I 
legislative agenda for judicial reform. For leg- 
islative change cannot be proposed without be- 
ing endorsed, and how could Taft endorse leg- 
islation without rendering an advisory opin- 
ion?l48 
The dialectic of this dilemma is vividly ex- 
posed in the story of Taft’s attempt to relieve 
federal courts of the flood of small criminal cases 
that Prohibition had swept into their jurisdic- 
tion. Not only did these cases clog the docket, 
but federal judges found them intensely de- 
moralizing.149 Almost from the day he took of- 
fice Taft believed that legislation was needed 
to allow United States Commissioners to try 
such cases.150 In 1923, at the second meeting 
ofthe Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, Taf? 
pushed through a resolution to the effect that 
“in prohibition and other misdemeanor cases” 
U.S. Commissioners be authorized “in all cases 
in which the defendants do not file written de- 
mands for jury trial, to take and file written pleas 
of guilty and to hear the evidence on pleas of 
not guilty and to file in court their reports of the 
cases and their recommendations of what judg- 
ment should be entered.”l51 Taft regarded this 
resolution as one of the “most important” of 
the Conference.152 
The recommendation went nowhere, how- 
ever, and so in December 1925 Taft on his own 
initiative sought to revive the plan. He wrote 
to Representative George S. Graham, Chair of 
the House Judiciary Committee, and to Senator 
Albert Cummins, Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, that he was “very much troubled 
about the conditions that prevail in the District 
Courts of the United States. They are being 
demoralized by this police court business.” Taft 
proposed an elaborate legislative scheme to 
remedy the situation. 
How would this suggestion strike 
you? Provide that in every District there 
should be appointed a Judicial Commis- 
sioner to serve during good behavior, 
that he should have authority to hold 
court, try jury trials and have jurisdic- 
tion to try misdemeanors and felonies, 
punishment for which shall not exceed 
two years’ imprisonment; that he should 
be given the power to compel the de- 
fendants to elect whether they desire 
Representative George Graham (above), Chair 
of the House Judiciary Committee, told Repre- 
sentative Duncan Denison of Illinois that the 
Chief Justice had merely alerted members of 
Congress to a problem in need of solution, 
without proposing any particular legislative 
response. This was, in fact, untrue: six months 
earlier Taft had written to Graham to propose 
legislation to allow U.S. Commissioners to 
hear cases arising from Prohibition so as to 
keep the petty criminal cases from clogging 
federal dockets. 
jury trials within ten days after the fil- 
ing of the information or the indict- 
ment; that he should be required to 
act also as a regular United States 
Commissioner, and might be called 
upon by the District Judge to act as a 
Master in Chancery or a Referee. . . . 
I don’t think he thought to be ap- 
pointed by the President, but that as 
Judicial Commissioner his might be 
regarded as an inferior office, and un- 
der the Constitution he could be ap- 
pointed by the District Court . . . . Can 
not you think this over and frame a 
bill? Something ought to be done. I just 
throw out this suggestion, with the 
hope that it may germinate into some- 
thing.153 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 65 
Six months later, in the course of debate on 
a bill to authorize the appointment of additional 
district judges, Representative Graham ob- 
served on the floor of the House that he was 
“in conference with representatives of the Sen- 
ate Judiciary Committee and some of the judges 
of the Supreme Court trying to work out some 
scheme by which the courts of the United 
States might be relieved of some of the very 
heavy burdens which they are now obliged to 
carry.” Graham pledged to “strive to create some 
plan by which a minor judiciary may be cre- 
ated.”*54 Representative Duncan Denison of 
Illinois rose to inquire into “the wisdom of tak- 
ing into these conferences, in trying to work 
out legislation that will relieve the courts of a 
part of their work, the members of the Supreme 
Court. Does the gentleman think that is a wise 
policy?”l55 Thrown on the defensive, Graham 
quickly backpedaled: 
Mr. GRAHAM. Well, without passing any 
opinion upon the wisdom of the policy, it came 
about without our solicitation and we attended 
simply as conferees. 
Mr. DENISON. In the constitutional con- 
vention . . . that theory was abandoned as be- 
ing unwise, the theory of having the Supreme 
Court advise the Congress as to legislation, 
and I think if we should return to that policy it 
would be a dangerous one. 
Mr. GRAHAM. I may say that this confer- 
ence arose and was called through the inter- 
vention of the Supreme Court judges, upon 
one of whom, the Chief Justice, there depended 
the duty of reviewing the work in the district 
courts all over the United States in the con- 
gested districts and trying to provide a rem- 
edy. He simply called the chairman and the rank- 
ing member of each Judiciary Committee in to 
ask them to take up the subject and see if there 
could not be some plan devised. That is all. 
Mr. DENISON. What I have in mind is this. 
Suppose the Congress should enact legisla- 
tion that is intended to create some sort of sub- 
ordinate courts to relieve the other courts of 
some of their duties, and afterwards the consti- 
tutionality of the legislation should be raised in 
the courts, if the Supreme Court had been con- 
sulted and advised in the preparation of the 
law, it seems to me it would be embarrassing, 
and I do not believe the committee of the House 
ought to do that. 
Mr. GRAHAM. I think, perhaps, ethically 
the gentleman is correct, and I am not going to 
dispute that proposition, but I do say it was 
perfectly competent for those who had charge 
of the court business throughout the country 
to call our attention to it and ask us to take it up 
independently; and that is all that was done. 
Mr. DENISON. I see no objection to that. 
Mr. GRAHAM. That is all that was done. 
They would not be taken into consideration in 
framing the legislation for the legislative duty 
would rest upon the House and the Senate.Is6 
The dialogue crisply captures the dilemma 
of any American Chief Justice aspiring to ad- 
vocate legislative reform. Representative Gra- 
ham deftly defused Denison’s challenge by 
asserting that Taft had merely called the atten- 
tion of members of Congress to a problem in 
need of solution, without proposing any par- 
ticular legislative response. But we know from 
Taft’s correspondence of six months earlier that 
this was not true. Had the real facts been known, 
Taft’s “embarrassment” would indeed have 
been acute. 
Taft apparently took the point. When 
Frances Caffey subsequently wrote him to in- 
quire about the status of the 1923 recommen- 
dation of the Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges so as to be able more effectively to 
lobby for bills expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. 
Commissioners then pending before Con- 
gress,157 Taft responded with uncharacteristic 
caution: “I have to be careful in taking part 
myself in the preparation of such a bill, because 
any bill is likely to come before our Court for 
interpretation and inquiry into its validity.”ls* 
Taft’s zeal to refashion judicial administration 
had been checked by the institutional realities 
of American judicial review. 
Sometimes, however, that zeal pushed Taft 
plainly beyond what would today be regarded 
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as elementary norms ofjudicial propriety. The 
strong temptations generated by his urgent 
sense of responsibility for the federal judicial 
branch are well revealed by his struggle against 
S. 624, a bill sponsored by Senator Thaddeus 
Caraway of Arkansas that would make it re- 
versible error for a federal judge to comment on 
the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the 
eviden~e.15~ Most states prohibited judges from 
such comments, and Taft had long regarded 
these prohibitions as empowering “acute and 
eloquent counsel for the defense” to promote 
“an atmosphere of fog and error and confu- 
sion,” and so drastically to impede the orderly 
administration ofjustice.160 For decades he had 
taken every opportunity passionately to op- 
pose them.161 So when S. 624 was approved by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and then by 
the Senate itself, Taft was galvanized into ac- 
tion. 
“I am trying to prevent the passage of a bill 
aimed at the usefulness of the Federal courts,” 
he wrote to his wife: 
which seeks to deny to Federal Judges 
the power to comment on the evi- 
dence as the English Judges do. This 
has always been done in the Federal 
Courts and has contributed much to 
their effectiveness. Now these dema- 
gogues and damage lawyers are at- 
tempting to put the Federal Courts on 
the basis of the State courts in this 
regard. The bill has passed the Sen- 
ate and the Senators yielded supinely, 
except Reed of Pennsylvania. It has 
been reported out of the House Judi- 
ciary Committee, but I am hoping to 
hold it over until the next session, in 
which case I feel fairly confident that 
I can induce the President to veto it, 
and I believe his veto would prevent 
its passage. There is a serious ques- 
tion as to whether it is constitutional, 
but I would prefer much to have it 
beaten through a veto than to throw 
upon the Court the question of its con- 
stitutionality. 162 
Tafi attempted to secure a commitment from 
Judiciary Committee Chair George S. Graham to 
hold hearings on the bill in the House, and he 
sought “to have the various Bar Associations 
. . . apply to the committee to be heard upon 
this bill in opposition to it, both on the ground 
of its doubtful constitutionality and also be- 
cause of its interference with the efficiency of 
the Federal courts.”163 
Not content with this blatantly political ma- 
neuvering and mobilization, Taft on December 
2,1924, composed a remarkable Memorandum 
in opposition to the bill. The cover sheet to the 
Memorandum, which Taft apparently drafted 
for his own records, states: 
I am exceedingly anxious to beat the 
bill. . . because it will really greatly in- 
terfere with the Federal judicial system. 
I was able to hold the bill off last ses- 
sion through Chairman Graham and Snell 
of the Rules Committee in the House. I 
have been to see the Attorney General 
once or twice about it and I saw the 
President this morning and asked him 
to read this memorandum. I am quite 
sure that he will be inclined to veto the 
bill, but it ought not to come to him, and 
I think the Attorney General suggests 
his sending for Graham and Nick 
Longworth to see whether it can not be 
shelved. I submitted the memorandum 
to Van De Vanter [sic] and he fully ap- 
proved the statement, but he thought 
that I put a little too much admiration 
for the English in it. However, as this is 
not to be published and is only a confi- 
dential memorandum for the President 
and the Attorney General, and as I have 
only given out one copy in addition to 
that given to Van Devanter, there is no 
occasion for changing my view which 
is stated herein, or ameliorating it with 
reference to prejudices against En- 
gland.164 
The Memorandum itself is a twelve-page 
document arguing that the Caraway bill would 
greatly “weaken the usefulness and efficiency 
of Federal Courts in the dispatch of business 
involving jury trials.”16s On page six the Memo- 
randum addresses the “question . . . whether 
Congress may by law effect this demoralizing 
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assault on the trials in our Federal Courts. For- 
tunately the right of the Judge to exercise this 
power of summing up to a jury upon the facts is 
conferred upon him by the Constitution of the 
United States, and can not be taken away by 
legislation.”166 The remainder of the Memoran- 
dum constitutes a detailed argument for this 
proposition, concluding: 
In view of these authorities, it can 
not be that Congress may take away the 
power of a Judge of a United States 
Court in carrying on a jury trial, to com- 
ment on the evidence and even express 
his opinion on the facts, if he leaves the 
question of facts clearly to the jury ulti- 
mately. It was an essential element of a 
jury trial in the English courts when the 
Declaration of Independence was 
signed and our Constitution was framed 
and adopted and when the 7th Amend- 
ment became part of it. That being true, 
Congress may not impair the institution 
by attempting to restrain Federal Judges 
from the discretion to exercise the power 
vested in them by the fundamental 
iaW.167 
The Memorandum is a stunning document. 
It is a fidly developed advisory opinion, crafted 
by Taft for the explicit purpose of affecting the 
outcome of legislation. Taft knew that the 
Memorandum was ethically suspect, which is 
why he controlled so tightly its dissemination. 
It is revealing that at first Taft circulated the 
Memorandum only to the President, with whose 
structural position vis-a-vis Congress Taft 
clearly felt a strong affinity. 
As Caraway continued to press his legisla- 
tion, however, Tafi grew bolder. In March he 
wrote to his brother Henry that “We stopped 
the Caraway bill to take away the power of the 
Federal Judges in charging a jury, and I am go- 
ing to take time by the forelock to prime Sena- 
tor David Reed of Pennsylvania on the prob- 
able unconstitutionality of such a law.’’16* Taft 
enclosed a copy of his Memorandum,169 and in 
May he suggested to Henry that “If I were you 
I would open a correspondence with the only 
man who opposed it in the Senate, and that 
was Senator Reed of Pennsylvania. You might 
send a copy of it also to Senator C u m i n s  and 
another one to Senator Gillett. Don’t make me 
the author of it, for reasons that you will under- 
stand.”l70 
Tafi’s opposition to the Caraway bill never 
did erupt into scandal, although this seems 
more a matter of luck than anything else. The 
very intensity that Taft brought to the cause of 
judicial administration betrayed him into ac- 
tions that could scarcely be defended in pub- 
lic. Of course, on the other side of the coin, it is 
no doubt due to Taft’s vigorous interventions 
that federal judges enjoy to this day the tradi- 
tional common law prerogative to comment on 
the weight of evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses.171 But this result cannot justify the 
means Taft used, which can only be explained 
by reference both to the passion of his commit- 
ment and to the inherent ambiguities of the 
English model of a judicial executive adminis- 
trator. Taft’s opposition to S .  624 demonstrates 
what a dangerous model this could be when 
transposed to the American context. 
Iv 
It was said of Taft that the chiefjusticeship 
was his “manifest destiny.”17* Certainly he 
freely admitted that the office was “the ambi- 
tion of my life.”l73 When Taft finally attained 
that ambition, it was after a long career of ex- 
ecutive administration: as Governor of the Phil- 
ippines, Secretary of War, and President of the 
United States. Taft brought this experience with 
him as he appropriated the role of Chief Justice 
and made it his own. It was natural for him to 
regard the administrative duties of the chiefjus- 
ticeship as analogous to the executive respon- 
sibilities with which he was so familiar, espe- 
cially because there were powerful English pre- 
cedents for this approach to judicial adminis- 
tration. 
The most lasting effect of Taft’s unique per- 
spective was its root assumption that the fed- 
eral judiciary was not a collection of indepen- 
dent judges, but instead a unified branch of 
government with functional obligations. No 
Chief Justice after Taft has been able to escape 
being evaluated on his fidfillment of these obli- 
gations. In this regard, Taft did indeed trans- 
form the office of Chief Justice. 
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But Taft, flush with the enthusiasm of a new 
idea, and filled with the contacts and assurance 
of an admired ex-President, pushed this per- 
spective to its natural limits. The difficulty he 
encountered, but clearly did not fully concep- 
tualize, was that executive administration in the 
context of a regime of separation of powers 
contains important elements that are essentially 
political, and that therefore stand in tension 
with American ideals ofjudicial nonpartisanship 
and with the American institution of judicial 
review. Taft struggled with this tension 
throughout his tenure as Chief Justice, acting 
in ways that fell on different sides of what to- 
day might be regarded as obvious ethical 
boundaries. 
Taft truly deserves to be known as the fa- 
ther of federal judicial management. We can 
learn from his difficulties, however, how subtle 
and complex is the relationship between the 
imperatives ofjudicial management and Ameri- 
can norms of proper judicial behavior. Chief 
Justices after Taft can no longer share his na- 
ive Progressive faith in the neutrality of disin- 
terested administration. In our own fallen world 
of post-Progressive disillusion, Chief Justices 
must somehow negotiate between the necessi- 
ties of functional rationality and the require- 
ments ofjudicial neutrality. If Taft can teach us 
anything, it is that this negotiation will be nei- 
ther clear nor easy. 
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66William Howard Taft, “The Attacks of the Courts 
and Legal Procedure,” 5 Kentucky Law Journaf 3, 16 
(1916). “Somebody . . . ought to be made the chief of 
the body of Judges who cover a certain territory and 
have the power to assign the business, so that each 
Judge shall be bound to follow that assignment. There 
is not the slightest reason why the same strategy . . . 
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furter and Landis write: 
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Hundreds ofjudges holding court in as many 
or more districts scattered over a continent must 
be subjected to oversight and responsibility as 
parts of an articulated system of courts. The judi- 
ciary, like other political institutions, must be di- 
rected. An executive committee of the judges, 
with the Chief Justice of the United States at its 
head, is a fit and potent instrument for the task. 
Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, “The Business 
of the Supreme Court of the United States-A Study in 
the Federal Judicial System-Part VI: The Conference 
of Senior Circuit Judges,” 40 Harvard Law Review 
431, 456 (1927). 
70Taft to John A. Peters, October 11, 1927, Taft Pa- 
pers, Reel 295. See also Joseph Buffington to Taft, 
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Ferdinand A. Geiger, November 17, 1927, Taft Pa- 
pers, Reel 296; Taft to William N. Runyon, March 12, 
Taft Papers, Reel 300. 
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7ZTaft to John F. Sater, August 27, 1921, Taft Papers, 
Reel 233. 
73Taft to Robert Taft, October 2, 1927, Taft Papers, 
Reel 295. 
74Taft to Horace Taft, December 30, 1921, Taft Pa- 
pers, Reel 237. Taft wrote: “I am trying to get more 
solidarity of action among the Federal Judges, so that 
they shall feel that we are all working toward the same 
end.” Taft to Helen Manning, March 25, 1923, Taft 
Papers, Reel 252. 
75Taft to Frank S. Dietrich, January 17, 1927, Taft 
Papers, Reel 288. See James Morton to Taft, June 23, 
1925, Taft Papers, Reel 275: 
I just received and read the recommenda- 
tions of the Judicial Conference. I wish you 
could be a District Judge for a while just to 
know what excellent work you and the Con- 
ference are doing. The recommendation last 
year about liquor cases,-that the Federal 
Courts should entertain only the more im- 
portant ones,-was of the greatest assis- 
tance in dealing with the liquor situation. 
It gave the District Judges solid standing 
ground from which to urge that course on 
the United States Attorneys, who are rather 
inclined to prosecute everybody for every- 
thing lest they be accused of favoritism or 
remissness. 
76Taft to John S. Partidge, January 22, 1925, Taft 
Papers, Reel 271. See Taft to John M. Cotteral, May 
19, 1926, Taft Papers, Reel 282: 
It is too bad that we in the Court here in 
Washington do not have greater opportunity 
to meet in the flesh the Judges who are on the 
firing line in the Federal Judiciary, and who 
have so much labor thrust on them which they 
do not have assistance enough properly to 
dispose of. I am constantly afraid of hearing 
of the breaking down of some of the District 
Judges under the burden they have to carry, 
and I wish you to know that we here at the 
Nation’s Capital are fully conscious of the 
debt that we and the country owe to you Dis- 
trict Judges. 
77Taft to William B. Gilbert, December 15, 1924, Taft 
Papers, Reel 270. 
78See, e.g., Frank S. Dietrich to Tafi, January 12, 1927, 
Taft Papers, Reel 288; Augustus Hand to Taft, May 
31,  1927, Taft Papers, Reel 292. 
79Learned Hand to Taft, March 1, 1923, Taft Papers, 
Reel 251. A year later, Hand wrote to Taft: 
As I have had occasion to tell you before, 
I feel I have a vested interest in your being 
Chief Justice, because you are the first Chief 
Justice that ever recognized such things as 
District Courts except when they were offi- 
cially brought to their attention to reverse. 
Learned Hand to Taft, February 8, 1924, Taft Papers, 
Reel 261. 
80Taft to Frank S. Dietrich, January 17, 1927, Taft 
Papers, Reel 288. 
81Taft to Robert Taft, October 2, 1927, Taft Papers, 
Reel 295. 
82By 1925, for example, when Congress was appropn- 
ating needed funds for “the purchase of law books . . . 
for United States judges, district attorneys, and other 
judicial officers,” it subjected the distribution of the 
funds “to the approval of the conference of senior 
circuit judges.” Public Law No. 631, 43 Stat. 1333. 
Illustrative of the way that Taft personally used the 
Conference may be found in his campaign to authorize 
the appointment of extra federal judges in New York 
City. In a letter to Charles Evans Hughes, Taft asked 
him to petition Congress for the additional judges, 
adding “I shall do what I can here, and I shall get the 
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges . . . to take ac- 
tion.” Taft to Charles Evans Hughes, March 25, 1925, 
Taft Papers, Reel 272. Beginning in 1925, the Con- 
ference repeatedly recommended the creation of these 
judgeships. The recommendations figured prominently 
in Congress’s eventual authorization of three addi- 
tional judges for the Southern District of New York. 
See Public Law No. 820, 45 Stat. 1317 (1929). See 70 
Congressional Record, 70h Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1742- 
1748 (January 15,  1929). In fact frequent references 
to the Conference led Representative George Graham 
to exclaim, “We did not surrender our legislative func- 
tion when we created” the Conference. Id. at 1743. 
83Report of the Fourth Conference of Senior Circuit 
Judges called by the Chief Justice pursuant to the Act 
of Congress of September 14, 1922, p. 38, Taft Pa- 
pers, Reel 618. There are many indications of the 
influence of the Conference’s recommendations. Pub- 
lic Law 373, 46 Stat. 774, for example, authorized the 
hiring of law clerks for circuit judges. 7lSt Cong., 2”d 
Sess. (June 17, 1930). The Conference had recom- 
mended such a law in 1927, 1928, and 1929, and its 
recommendations figured prominently in the legisla- 
tive history of the Act. See House Report No. 30, 7lSt 
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Cong., 2nd Sess. (December 12, 1929); Senate Report 
No. 830, 71%’ Cong., 2”d Sess. (May 29, 1930). In the 
single month of March 1927, the 69th Congress, in 
direct response to the recommendations of the Con- 
ference, created new judgeships in the Northern Dis- 
trict of California (Public Law No. 739, 44 Stat. 1372), 
the District of Maryland (Public Law No. 700, 44 Stat. 
1346), the Western District of North Carolina (Public 
Law No. 693, 44 Stat. 1339), the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (Public Law No. 701, 44 Stat. 1347), 
the Western District of New York (Public Law No. 
735, 44 Stat. 1370), the Eastern District of Michigan 
(Public Law No. 747, 44 Stat. 1380), and the District 
of Connecticut (Public Law No. 703, 44 Stat. 1348). 
X 4 T h ~ s  in March 1927 Congress also created an addi- 
tional judgeship for the Northern District of New York. 
Public Law No. 741,44 Stat. 1374. This judgeship had 
not been recommended by the Conference, but the 
Senate Report on the bill quotes at length from a letter 
by John Sargent, the Attorney General, who states: 
Although the northern district of New 
York was not included among the districts for 
which the conference of senior circuit judges 
has recommended additional district judges, 
Chief Justice Taft, who presides over the con- 
ference, has, since the last meeting of the 
conference, specially examined the situation 
in the northern district of New York and con- 
cluded that an additional district judge is needed 
there. The Chief Justice says: 
“I have been examining the statistics of 
the cases in the northern district of New York 
and in the western district, and I am bound to 
concede that the showing is strong for an ad- 
ditional judge in the northern district as well 
as in the western district.” 
Senate Report No. 1557, 69th Congress, 2nd Sess. 
(February 27,1927). 
8SThus when Congress authorized the appointment of 
two extra judges for the Eighth Circuit as recommended 
by the Conference, Pub. Law No. 555, 43 Stat. 11 16, 
Taft personally testified in favor of the bill, Senate 
Report No. 705, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 3, 1924), 
pp. 1-5. His personal support figured prominently in 
congressional debates. See 66 Congressional Record, 
pt. 5, 68th Congress, 2nd Sess., 5202 (March 2, 1925). 
The day after the passage of the bill Judge William 
Kenyon of the Eighth Circuit wrote Taft that “there is 
no doubt in my mind as to who is responsible for its 
enactment, and I am therefore writing you thanking 
and congratulating you on behalf of this Circuit. Thou 
art the man.” William Kenyon to Taft, March 4, 
1925, Taft Papers, Reel 272. 
x6So, for example, Taft was willing to recommend that 
the Congress authorize an additional judge for the West- 
em District of Michigan to compensate for the incapaci- 
tated Clarence Sessions, even though the Conference had 
not made any such recommendation. See Public Law 423, 
43 Stat. 949; H.R. Report No. 1427,68th Cong. 2nd Sess. 
(February 10, 1925) (“This bill has the approval of Chief 
Justice Taft, who, according to the hearings, has person- 
ally investigated the physical condition of Judge Sessions.”) 
For a similar example of Taft going outside the recom- 
mendations of the Conference, see Public Law No. 663, 
45 Stat. 1081 (1929), which created an additional judge- 
ship in the Southern District of Florida. The Senate Report 
on the bill relies heavily on Taft’s personal recommenda- 
tion. Senate Report No. 631,70th Cong. 1st Sess. (March 
26, 1928). Another example is Public Law No. 528, 43 
Stat. 1098, March 2, 1925, which authorized the appoint- 
ment of a district judge for the District of Minnesota. The 
authorization was necessary because of the unexpected 
suicide of Judge John McGee. Although the Conference 
had not recommended the authorization, the House Re- 
port relied upon Taft’s personal endorsement. House Re- 
port No. 1540,68th Cong., 2nd Sess. (February 20, 1925). 
87Taft to Frank H. Hiscock, April 12, 1922, Taft Papers, 
Reel 24 I .  
“Taft to Horace Taft, March 30, 1922, Taft Papers, 
Reel 240. 
X9Taft to Charles M. Hepburn, April 10, 1923, Taft 
Papers, Reel 252. Persistence, wrote Taft, “is the 
only way of getting anything through Congress.” 
9oTaft to Horace Taft, October 6, 1921, Taft Papers, 
Reel 234. 
g’Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judi- 
ciary on H.R. 10479, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., Serial 33, 
March 30, 1922, p.10. 
9ZHearing Before Subcommittee of House Committee 
on Appropriations in Charge of Deficiency Appro- 
priations on the Second Deficiency Appropriations 
Bill, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., May 13, 1926, p. 766. The 
next month Taft was “delighted” to notify George W. 
Anderson of the First Circuit that “the Court of Ap- 
peals has ruled in our favor” and authorized the appro- 
priation. Taft to George W. Anderson, June 4, 1926, 
Taft Papers, Reel 282. See Public Law No. 492, 44 
Stat. 841, 859 (July 3, 1926). 
9’Taft to Charles P. Taft, 2nd, January 27, 1924, Taft 
Papers, Reel 260. 
y4“McReynolds is a Democrat and knows many of the 
Senators,” Taft explained. “Sutherland has been a 
Senator, and Van Devanter is one of the most forcible 
of ow Court and most learned on questions of jurisdic- 
tion.” Taft to Thomas W. Shelton, January 31, 1924, 
Taft Papers, Reel 261. Taft was quite clear “that in 
my judgment it will help the passage of both bills if I do 
not make myself prominent in their advocacy.” 
9sHearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the House of Representatives on H.R. 8206, 68th 
Cong., 2nd Sess., December 18, 1924, Serial 45. As 
Taft said in the context of his proposed legislation 
that would enable federal courts to merge law and eq- 
uity and promulgate rules of procedure, “I am deter- 
mined to push a movement for the betterment of the 
procedure in the Federal courts. 1 suppose I weigh 
down such reform by my advocacy of it, in arousing the 
opposition of certain elements, especially in the Senate, 
but I don’t h o w  why that should prevent my initiating 
matters when nobody is likely to do so.” Taft to Horace 
Taft,April 17, 1922,TaftPapers,Reel241. 
96 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, “1996 Year-End 
Report on the Federal Judiciary,” The Third Branch, 
Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 1997), at 1 ,6 .  
97Public Law No. 563,44 Stat. 1022 (1927). 
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Papers, Reel 278. 
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Morning Tribune, July 18, 1921, p.6. For a discussion of 
Taft’s career as a columnist, see James F. Vivian. William 
Howard Taft: Collected Editorials 1917-1921 (Praeger 
1990). 
‘@*Address to NY Country Bar Ass’n, February 18, 1922, 
Taft Papers, Reel 590, p.2. 
‘09Taft to Clarence Kelsey, August 17, 1923, Taft Papers, 
Reel 256. See Taft to Charles Evans Hughes, April 26, 
1926, Taft Papers, Reel 282 (“Bar Associations are formed 
too often for merely social enjoyment and fraternization, 
with only a modicum of effort to . . . exert a controlling 
influence upon the legislative bodies for real reform mea- 
sures in respect to courts and legal procedure.”) 
IloElihu Root to Taft, September 9,1922, Taft Papers, Reel 
245. 
‘1I“Adequate Machinery for Judicial Business,” 7 ABAJ 
453 (1921). 
Il*“The Chief Justice,” 5 The Chicago Bar Association 
Record pp. 8-13 (December 1921). 
‘1362 Congressional Record, pt. 3,67th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
pp. 2582-2583 (February 15, 1922). See “Taft’s Public 
Speeches Criticized in the Senate,” TheNew York Tribune, 
February 16, 1922, p. 2. 
’1462 Congressional Record, pt. 3,67th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
pp. 2582-2583 (February 15, 1922). Senator Hams also 
very much objected to Justice Clarke’s recent speech urg- 
ing cancellation of the foreign war debt. See “Justice Clarke 
Urges Prompt Cancellation of War Debt,” Chicago Jour- 
nal of Commerce, February 9,1922, p. 1; 62 Congressional 
Record, pt. 3,67th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 2525-2526 (Feb- 
ruary 14, 1922) (‘7 have the greatest respect and admira- 
tion for Justice Clarke . . . . However, I think that the 
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States should 
keep out of any matters that are political. . . . I do not think 
it is the part of wisdom for a Supreme Court Justice to 
publicly discuss matters to be decided by Congress.”) (Re- 
marks of Senator Harris). 
IL5Address to NY County Bar Ass’n, February 18, 1922, 
Taft Papers, Reel 590, pp. 2-3. Taft left no doubt about the 
target of his remarks: 
It is a source of some embarrassment for me 
to rise here and not to talk to you as I would like 
to talk to you, free from the fetters of the office 
which I hold. . . . I am struggling to be worthy of 
the bench of which I am a member. I am strug- 
gling to fall into the customs and requirements of 
that position. We have been warned in the Sen- 
ate of the United States what our narrow function 
is and with due respect to that warning, I am go- 
ing to confine myself to a written manuscript. 
Id. at 1-2. For press coverage of the speech, see “Taft Ap- 
proves Laws to Clear Court Dockets,” New York Tribune, 
February 19, 1922, p.13; “Taft Backs Bills to Speed Tri- 
als,” The New York Times, February 19, p. 18. 
“6Minneapoli.s Morning Tribune, July 18, 1921, in Taft 
Papers, Reel 626. 
117 Taft’s commitment to this position is evident in the Can- 
ons of Judicial Ethics that were approved by the ABA in 
July 1924. Lisa L. Milord, The Development of the ABA 
Judicial Code 13 1-143 (American Bar Association 1992). 
Taft had been appointed in February 1922 as the Chair of 
the small ABA Committee charged with drafting the Can- 
ons. See Cordenio Severance to Taft, February 4, 1922, 
Taft Papers, Reel 238; Taft to Cordenio Severance, Febru- 
ary 9, 1922, Taft Papers, Reel 239. Canon 23 explicitly 
provides: 
A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe 
the operation of statutes, especially those relat- 
ing to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend 
to impede the just disposition of controversies; 
and he may well contribute to the public interest 
by advising those having authority to remedy 
defects of procedure, of the result of his observa- 
tion and experience. 
An early version of this Canon, drafted about June 1922, 
was even more explicit: 
Judges have a peculiar opportunity to observe 
the operation of statutes, especially those relat- 
ing to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend 
to impede the reasonable and just disposition of 
controversies; they should not be indifferent to 
shocking results; and they may well contribute to 
the public interest by advising both the people 
and their representatives of the result of their ob- 
servation and experience; there is no need of dif- 
fidence in this respect, ouf of a false fear of being 
considered to be unduly interfering with another 
department of the Government. 
Judges may well direct diligent effort toward 
securing from proper authority such modifications 
of laws or rules tending, in their experience, to 
impede or prevent the reasonable and just dispo- 
sition of litigation, as will rectify the evils dis- 
covered by them. 
Charles Boston to Taft, June 8, 1922, Taft Papers, Reel 
242. For the ABA’s most recent standard on this subject, 
see ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1990), Canon 
4(B), Comment 1. 
Il8S. 3151,70thCong., 1st Sess. (February 13, 1928). On 
opposition to federal court diversity jurisdiction in the 
South and West, see Tony A. Freyer, “The Federal Courts, 
Localism, and the National Economy, 1865-1900,” 53 
Business Histoy Review 343 (1 979); Hany N. Scheiber, 
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“Federalism, the Southern Regional Economy, and Public 
Policy Since 1865,” in David J. Bodenhamer and James 
W. Ely, Jr., Ambivalent Legacy: A Legal History of the 
South pp.69-104 (University Press of Mississippi 1984). 
‘]‘See 62 Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
pt. 5, p. 5 108 (April 6 ,  1922) (“In my judgment we ought 
to abolish every United States district court in America; 
we ought to abolish entirely the United States Court of 
Appeals, and leave nothing of our United States judicial 
system except the Supreme Court ofthe United States. We 
ought to give to State judges and State courts all the juris- 
diction.”) See George Norris to G. Jay Clark, January 2, 
1928, Norris Papers (“In fact, I have gone so fat as to ad- 
vocate the abolition of all Federal courts except the Su- 
preme Court.”) 
I2OSee Senate Report No. 626,70th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 
27,1928). The Committee Report said simply, “The com- 
mittee can conceive of no reason why the district court of 
the United States should have jurisdiction in these cases.” 
Id. at 2. 
l2lTaft to Horace Taft, April 16, 1928, Taft Papers, Reel 
301. 
’22Taft to George Wickersham, March 29, 1928, Taft Pa- 
pers, Reel 300. 
IZ3Taft to Newton Baker, April 5,  1928, Taft Papers, Reel 
301. 
124Taft to Newton Baker, April 19, 1928, Taft Papers, Reel 
301. 
I25Taft to CasperYost,April5,1928, Taft Papers, Reel 301. 
12h‘‘Federal Courts in Peril,” St. Louis Daily Globe-Demo- 
crat, April 10, 1928, p.18. See Casper Yost to Taft, April 
10, 1928, Taft Papers, Reel 301. Taft thanked Yost for the 
editorials: “I feel sure that they will attract attention.” Taft 
to Casper Yost, April 16, 1928, Taft Papers, Reel 301. 
127 Henry Taft was a named partner in the firm of 
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. 
128Taft to Henry W. Taft, April 5 ,  1928, Taft Papers, Reel 
301. Two days later Taft wrote his brother: 
What we desire is publicity. . . . You . . . might 
enlarge on the fact that such a bill as this would 
destroy the jurisdiction in those cases which 
McReynolds wrote from Oregon and from Ne- 
braska on the right of the Catholics to maintain 
separate schools and the right of the Germans to 
maintain separate education in German. If we can 
stir up the Germans and the Irish and the negroes 
to an appreciation of the importance to them of 
maintaining the jurisdiction of the trial courts, we 
can make the Democrats a bit chary of burning 
their fingers with such a revolutionary proposal. 
Taft to Henry W. Taft, April 7, 1928, Taft Papers, Reel 
301. In a postscript, Taft added, “I am mistaken as to the 
German language cases. They came from the Supreme 
Courts of the States. The other came from the U.S. Dis- 
trict Court.” 
12gSee Henry W. Taft to Taft, April 18, 1928, Taft Papers, 
Reel 301. 
‘)Osee Taft to Willis Van Devanter, April 15, 1928, Van 
Devanter Papers: “They seem to be slow in New York to 
take up the question. My brother Harry is preparing the 
argument for his editorial friends in New York, but he takes 
so long that they might pass the bill in the Senate before 
he gets his articles ready.” 
l3]Taft o Henry W. Taft, April 21,1928, Taft Papers, Reel 
301. 
13*Henry W. Taft to Taft, April 20, 1928, Taft Papers, Reel 
30 1. Henry W. Taft also drafted a long report on behalf of 
the ABA Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 
and managed to have the ABA Executive Committee go 
on record against the bill on April 24. Senator Copeland 
had the Executive Committee resolution, as well as the 
report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Re- 
form, reprinted in the Congressional Record. 69 Congres- 
sional Record 8077-8080, pt. 8, 70th Cong., Is‘ Sess., May 
8,  1928. See also “An Unwise and Dangerous Measure,” 
14 ABAJ266 (May 1928). 
“Senate and Courts,” The New York Times, April 22, 
1928, Section 3 ,  p. 4. 
I J 4  69 Congressional Record 6379, pt. 6, 70” Cong., ls‘ 
Sess., April 13, 1928. Norris refused to hold hearings on 
the bill, saying that “it is a bill on which I think no particu- 
lar hearings are necessary. It is entirely a legal proposi- 
tion. . . . It is purely a question of practice that the lawyers 
on the Judiciary Committee understand as well as do other 
attorneys.’’ Id. at 6378. 
‘35 “Senate and Courts,” The New York Times, April 22, 
1928, Section 3, p. 4. 
lJ669 Congressional Record 742 1-7422, pt. 7, 70th 
Cong., lst Sess., April 30, 1928. See “Whittling Away 
at the Federal Tribunals,” 14 ABAJ 200 (1928). The 
ABAJ editorial particularly objected to the Bill’s 
repudiation of diversity jurisdiction: 
In an address at the San Francisco meeting 
of the American Bar Association, Chief Justice 
Taft, while disclaiming any discussion of legisla- 
tive policy, made the following pertinent remarks 
by way of comment on the proposal to relieve 
the Federal courts of congestion by taking away 
this jurisdiction: 
“I venture to think that there may be a strong 
dissent from the view that danger of local preju- 
dice in State Courts against nonresidents is at an 
end. Litigants from the eastern part of the coun- 
try who are expected to invest their capital in the 
West or South will hardly concede the proposi- 
tion that their interests as creditors will be as sure 
of impartial judicial consideration in a Western 
or Southern state as in a federal court. 
The rnateriat question is not so much whether 
the justice administered is actually impartial and 
fair, as it is whether it is thought to be so by those 
who are considering the wisdom of investing their 
capital in States where that capital is needed for 
the promotion of enterprises and industrial and 
commercial progress. No single element . . . in 
our governmental system has done so much to 
secure capital for the legitimate development of 
enterprises throughout the West and South as the 
existence of Federal courts there, with a jurisdic- 
tion to hear diverse citizenship cases.” 
Taft had addressed the San Francisco meeting of the 
American Bar Association on August 10, 1922. His 
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speech is reproduced in full in 6 Journal of the American 
Judicature Society 36 (1922), and in 57 The American Law 
Review 1 (1923). In his address before the ABA, Taft had 
also been careful to observe: “But of course the taking away 
of fundamental jurisdiction from the Federal Courts is 
within the power of Congress, and it is not for me to dis- 
cuss such a legislative policy.” Id. at 11. 
Brandeis did not accept Taft’s point about the impor- 
tance of diversity jurisdiction for facilitating the invest- 
ment of eastern capital in western and southern states: 
He speaks feelingly on the subject when- 
ever it comes up. I think his point is theoreti- 
cal, like much of the economists mouthing of 
the “rational man.” Of course, the bankers & 
still less the investors, do not give the subject 
of litigation any thought when they make 
loans. 
Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter, May 10, 1928, in Melvin 
I. Urofsky and David W. Levy, eds., “Half Brother, 
Half Son:” The Letters of  Louis D. Brandeis to 
Felix Frankfurter p. 331 (University of Oklahoma 
Press 1991). Frankfurter later published an article 
thanking Norris for sponsoring S. 3151 and thereby 
provoking discussion about the appropriate scope of 
federal jurisdiction, in which he virtually reiterated 
(without attribution) Brandeis’ comments about di- 
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Thomas Walsh to  Taft, December 4 ,  1925, Taft 
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than before.” 
I63Taft to Thomas W. Shelton, April 13, 1924, Taft Pa- 
pers, Reel 263. Taft noted that “I am not in a position 
to appear before the committee myself, because were 
I to oppose it, it would only sharpen the eagerness of 
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pare “Letters of Interest to the Profession,” 10 ABAJ 
443 (1924) (letter of C. Floyd Huff) (“[A] jury trial is 
a mockery far more so under a system which permits a 
Judge to make the last argument to the jury.”) See also 
id (letter ofAlvah J. Rucker). Compare Harry Eugene 
Kelly, “An Impending Calamity,” 11 ABAJ 65 (1925) 
with “Curbing Federal Judges,” 28 Law Notes 182 
(1925). 
164Memorandum, December 2, 1924, Taft Papers, Reel 
639. 
1651d. at 1. 
1661d. at 6. 
167Id. at 12. 
I6*Taft to Henry W. Taft, March 27, 1925, Taft Papers, 
Reel 272. 
lb9Henry W. Taft to Taft, March 28, 1925, Taft Papers, 
Reel 273. 
I7OTaft to Henry W. Taft, May 28, 1925, Taft Papers, 
Reel 274. Henry responded by sending to Taft a “copy 
of the proposed report of the [ABA] Committee on Ju- 
risprudence and Law Reform, which I prepared some 
weeks ago. . . . You will see from the report that I used 
your memorandum on the Caraway bill freely, adding 
something of my own.” Henry W. Taft to Taft, May 
29, 1925, Taft Papers, Reel 274. 
I7lSee Wright and Miller, 9 Federal Practice and Pro- 
cedure Civil 2d Section 2557 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein 
and Margaret A. Berger, 1 Evidence Section 107 (Mat- 
thew Bender 1994). See Quercia v. United States, 289 
U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (“In a trial by jury in a federal 
court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the 
governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its 
proper conduct. . .”) 
I7*Ernest Knaebel to Taft, July 1, 1921, Taft Papers, 
Reel 228. 
173“Taft Awed By Gaining Goal of His Ambition,” New 
YorkHerald, July 1, 1921, p.2. 
